Myanmar Internet Shutdown Tracker
Shutdown Tracker
Documented shutdowns sourced from OONI measurements, NetBlocks, and Cloudflare Radar. The Myanmar military junta has used internet shutdowns as a tool of political repression since the February 2021 coup.
OONI Anomaly Rate + CF Traffic Volume
Bars = OONI anomaly % · Teal line = CF Radar traffic (100% = peak, last 12 months)
Key Events
Verified Shutdowns
Access Now STOP Dataset · human-verified events · 95 Myanmar records
Source: Access Now STOP Dataset · verified by Access Now researchers · updated monthly · CC BY 4.0
Share of measurements per outcome · last 26 weeks · distinguishes confirmed blocks from unverified anomalies
Show data table
| Week | Confirmed % | Anomaly % | Failure % | OK % | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-11-30 | 1.1% | 26% | 3.1% | 69.8% | 3,532 |
| 2025-12-07 | 0.8% | 20% | 5.8% | 73.4% | 6,378 |
| 2025-12-14 | 0.7% | 19.5% | 3.2% | 76.6% | 6,116 |
| 2025-12-21 | 0.8% | 16.7% | 3.5% | 79% | 5,124 |
| 2025-12-28 | 0.7% | 14.7% | 6.1% | 78.6% | 6,192 |
| 2026-01-04 | 0.1% | 18.9% | 3.4% | 77.6% | 12,415 |
| 2026-01-11 | 1.1% | 21.1% | 3.3% | 74.5% | 8,045 |
| 2026-01-18 | 0.1% | 20.7% | 4.7% | 74.5% | 31,674 |
| 2026-01-25 | 0.5% | 22% | 3.4% | 74.2% | 13,370 |
| 2026-02-01 | 0.8% | 17.6% | 4% | 77.6% | 11,052 |
| 2026-02-08 | 2.8% | 17% | 6.1% | 74.1% | 7,687 |
| 2026-02-15 | 1.5% | 17.4% | 3.6% | 77.5% | 13,137 |
| 2026-02-22 | 1% | 12.1% | 16.3% | 70.6% | 11,845 |
| 2026-03-01 | 2.1% | 9.4% | 11.1% | 77.5% | 8,921 |
| 2026-03-08 | 3% | 13.2% | 3.6% | 80.1% | 2,084 |
| 2026-03-15 | 0.9% | 13.5% | 4% | 81.6% | 7,293 |
| 2026-03-22 | 1.4% | 11.9% | 3.6% | 83.1% | 8,645 |
| 2026-03-29 | 0.9% | 15.5% | 3.5% | 80.1% | 10,186 |
| 2026-04-05 | 0.4% | 9.9% | 3.2% | 86.5% | 9,001 |
| 2026-04-12 | 0.3% | 15.3% | 4.8% | 79.6% | 19,514 |
| 2026-04-19 | 0% | 13.5% | 3.5% | 83% | 17,401 |
| 2026-04-26 | 0.6% | 14.7% | 3.4% | 81.2% | 44,623 |
| 2026-05-03 | 0.7% | 14.9% | 3.6% | 80.8% | 34,614 |
| 2026-05-10 | 2% | 16.8% | 3.3% | 77.9% | 29,605 |
| 2026-05-17 | 0.6% | 14.6% | 3.7% | 81.1% | 39,409 |
| 2026-05-24 | 0.3% | 13.5% | 3.2% | 82.9% | 23,987 |
Recent Monthly Measurements
| OONI | Cloudflare Radar | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Measurements | Anomalies | Confirmed | Anomaly Rate | Traffic Level |
| 2026-05 | 138,895 | 20,943 | 1,234 | 15.1% | 94.3% |
| 2026-04 | 85,358 | 11,860 | 347 | 13.9% | 94.3% |
| 2026-03 | 31,030 | 3,797 | 466 | 12.2% | 93.5% |
| 2026-02 | 43,721 | 6,971 | 615 | 15.9% | 81% |
| 2026-01 | 66,856 | 13,772 | 227 | 20.6% | 33.4% |
| 2025-12 | 25,227 | 4,691 | 186 | 18.6% | 38.8% |
| 2025-11 | 29,055 | 6,730 | 233 | 23.2% | 26.1% |
| 2025-10 | 36,030 | 7,830 | 109 | 21.7% | 20.1% |
| 2025-09 | 50,761 | 9,614 | 128 | 18.9% | 14.9% |
| 2025-08 | 71,137 | 14,381 | 159 | 20.2% | 12.6% |
| 2025-07 | 41,184 | 8,688 | 13 | 21.1% | 13.9% |
| 2025-06 | 34,893 | 8,197 | 2 | 23.5% | 14.1% |
Measurement Methodology
This tracker combines four independent data layers — OONI Web Connectivity measurements, Cloudflare Radar traffic telemetry, BGP routing surveillance, and Access Now's human-verified shutdown registry — cross-corroborated continuously to document network interference and internet shutdowns in Myanmar since the February 2021 coup. No single source is treated as definitive; shutdown events are classified only when multiple signals converge.
OONI Web Connectivity
The primary signal comes from the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), a global passive measurement platform that probes web connectivity from volunteer-operated vantage points inside Myanmar. Each test fetches a curated URL from within the country and compares it against a control measurement taken outside. Discrepancies — DNS lookup failures, TCP/IP connection resets, HTTP-level blocking consistent with transparent proxying — are classified as anomalies. When anomalies cluster across multiple independent probes targeting the same URL or autonomous system, OONI records a confirmed blocking event.
We collect this data at three granularities: monthly (since February 2021), weekly (last 52 weeks), and daily (last 28 days). The main anomaly rate chart shows four stacked measurement categories for each period — ok (accessible), failure (network error not attributable to blocking), anomaly (probable interference), and confirmed (verified blocking against a known block-page fingerprint). The OONI Anomaly Breakdown chart below shows this composition as weekly percentage shares, revealing whether elevated anomaly rates reflect new confirmed blocks or a broader degradation across the probe network.
Cloudflare Radar Traffic Overlay
OONI captures application-layer interference but not total traffic volume. The primary chart overlays both signals simultaneously: bars show the OONI anomaly rate (left axis), and a teal line shows Cloudflare Radar Myanmar IP traffic on the right axis, normalised to a 0–100 index where 100 is the historical peak for the period. The diagnostic value lies in their relationship: a spike in anomalies with a simultaneous traffic drop is the strongest indicator of a population-level shutdown. Elevated anomalies without a traffic drop points to targeted content blocking while general connectivity holds. This distinction matters for documentation — a correlated anomaly spike and traffic drop constitutes strong technical evidence suitable for citation in legal filings and UN reporting.
The three time scales — 5-year monthly, 1-year weekly, 1-month daily — reveal different phenomena. Monthly shows the structural arc since the coup. Weekly reveals operational tempo: curfews, offensive-linked blackouts. Daily resolves intraday patterns. This approach mirrors methodologies used by NetBlocks and IODA (Georgia Tech / CAIDA).
Access Now STOP Dataset — Verified Shutdowns
The Verified Shutdowns section draws on the Access Now STOP Dataset, the global gold standard for human-confirmed internet shutdown documentation. Each record in this dataset represents a shutdown event that Access Now researchers have verified through direct contact with affected communities, cross-referenced with technical measurements and contemporaneous media reporting. Fields include start and end date, geographic scope, affected services, shutdown type, and the ordering authority where attributable.
We sync the dataset monthly from Access Now's public registry and filter to Myanmar. Events are classified into four types: full network (total blackout across fixed and mobile); mobile (mobile data cut while fixed broadband continues); platform (specific applications blocked — Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram); throttle (connectivity degraded rather than severed). These events are overlaid on the main OONI/CF Radar chart as coloured bands — red for full network, amber for mobile, purple for platform, slate for throttle — using a worst-type-per-period rendering that prevents compounding opacity across simultaneous events. The ⬡ Map view plots all events by administrative region; the timeline scrubber lets you move through any month since 2021 to see which regions were simultaneously affected. Hover a region for event count, date range, and type breakdown.
The STOP dataset typically trails real events by several months. This is intentional: Access Now researchers individually verify each shutdown through direct contact with affected communities, cross-reference with technical measurements, and confirm attribution before a record is published. That rigour is what makes the dataset citable by human rights organisations and courts — and why we treat it as the gold standard even when it is not the fastest signal.
OONI anomaly data and Access Now verified events are complementary: OONI provides continuous automated coverage across all dates but is limited to URL-level interference detectable from probe locations; Access Now records are manually verified and geographically attributed but depend on researcher capacity and community reporting. When both sources signal the same event, the evidence basis for documentation is substantially strengthened.
BGP Routing Surveillance
At the routing layer, we monitor Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) update activity for Myanmar's registered autonomous systems. Withdrawal of BGP prefixes — the routing announcements that make IP address blocks globally reachable — is a definitive technical signal of deliberate network disconnection. Our pipeline scans critical Myanmar ASNs including MPT (AS9988), Mytel (AS136168), Ooredoo Myanmar (AS132748), and Atom Myanmar (AS132167) every five minutes, classifying routing events by severity and probable cause. Full BGP history and outage records are available on the BGP Network Status page.
Anomaly Thresholds & Classification
Anomaly rates above 20% in a measurement period are flagged as high-severity disruptions. Rates between 10–20% are marked elevated, warranting contextual analysis. Below 10%, measurements are treated as baseline noise absent corroborating signals. Shutdown classification is not automated: key events in the timeline have been manually verified against reporting from Fortify Rights, Free Expression Myanmar (Athan), the Irrawaddy, Democratic Voice of Burma, and international wire services.
Limitations & Transparency
OONI coverage depends on active probe density inside Myanmar, which has declined since 2021 as digital security risks have increased for local researchers. Probe density is lowest in active conflict zones — Shan, Kachin, Rakhine — meaning localised shutdowns there are underrepresented. Cloudflare Radar reflects traffic transiting Cloudflare's network, not total internet; it is a robust proxy, not an absolute measure. Access Now's dataset coverage is contingent on researcher and community reporting capacity. OONI data: CC BY 4.0. Cloudflare Radar: CC BY-NC 4.0. Access Now STOP Dataset: CC BY 4.0. All data pipelines and processing scripts are documented and open for independent review.