Internet in Myanmar
LIVE DATA Updated May 20, 2026 at 24:01 UTC · Source: RIPEstat (RIPE NCC), IODA (Georgia Tech)

BGP Network Status — Myanmar ASNs

Real-time BGP routing visibility for all Myanmar autonomous systems, sourced from RIPEstat's 800+ global route collectors. When an ISP is ordered offline, its BGP prefixes withdraw within minutes — before any news report.

🟢 UP (stable >1h)  ·  🟡 RECOVERING (back online <1h)  ·  🔴 DOWN (BGP withdrawn)  ·  ⬛ OFF (dark >7 days)  ·  Updated every 5–30 min via VPS cron

Monitored
132
Myanmar ASNs
Currently down
0
BGP withdrawal detected
Recovering
3
Back online, monitoring
Long-term off
7
Dark >7 days

Most Disrupted Networks

BGP withdrawal events by network. Rank by outage count, then total downtime.

⚠ Outages under 5 min may be route flapping (BGP instability), not deliberate shutdown.

Outage Event History

Source: RIPEstat · IODA (Georgia Tech) · 1630 total outage events recorded

Status Change Log

Offline and recovery events detected from BGP route collector data, newest first.

#Date / Time (UTC)NetworkASNEventOutage duration

Only showing offline (BGP withdrawn) and recovery events. Intermediate flaps filtered out.

All Myanmar Networks

Rows:
Description ASN Type Status Visibility Since

Measurement Methodology

BGP Routing as a Shutdown Signal

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the routing infrastructure of the internet — the system by which autonomous systems announce the reachability of their IP address blocks to the global routing table. When a Myanmar ISP is ordered offline, its administrators withdraw its BGP prefix announcements. This withdrawal propagates through the global routing table within minutes, making the network unreachable from outside Myanmar and vice versa. BGP analysis is the fastest available technical signal for detecting deliberate network disconnections: withdrawals are typically observable 2–15 minutes after an order is executed, well before independent reporting or network monitoring alerts. It is the methodology used by IODA at Georgia Tech, NetBlocks, and OONI for corroborating application-layer interference with routing-layer evidence. See also our Shutdown Tracker for the application-layer view.

Route Collector Network

BGP data is sourced from RIPEstat (RIPE NCC), which aggregates routing table snapshots from 800+ globally distributed route collectors maintained by academic institutions, internet exchange points, and network operators. Each collector independently observes the global routing table from its vantage point. A prefix withdrawal is confirmed only when a threshold of multiple geographically distributed collectors no longer observe the route — reducing false positives from local peering changes, collector failures, or transient route flapping.

Visibility Percentage

Each ASN is assigned a visibility percentage representing the share of route collectors that currently observe at least one active prefix for that autonomous system, relative to that ASN's historical maximum. 100% indicates full global reachability. Drops below 50% are classified as significant partial outages; drops to 0% indicate complete disconnection from the global routing table. RECOVERING status is applied when visibility has returned from a DOWN state within the past 60 minutes — the network is back online but still being watched for stability.

Status Classification

DOWN — visibility dropped to ≤10% of historical baseline, sustained for more than 5 minutes. RECOVERING — visibility returned from DOWN within the past 60 minutes. UP — visibility stable above baseline for more than 1 hour. OFF — no BGP presence detected for more than 7 days; network dark, not temporarily disrupted. Outage events under 5 minutes are flagged as probable route flapping (BGP instability caused by hardware faults or misconfiguration) rather than deliberate shutdown, consistent with the filtering methodology used by IODA and CAIDA.

Network Type Classification (MNO / ISP / IGW / IXP)

Each autonomous system is classified by network function based on observed BGP peering behaviour, prefix announcements, and routing relationships — not on Myanmar government registry filings or operator self-declaration. Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are identified by large consumer-facing prefix blocks with predominantly stub AS topology. International Gateway operators (IGWs) are identified by transit relationships with upstream international carriers and the presence of upstream BGP sessions crossing Myanmar's international borders. Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are identified by shared peering fabrics with multiple local ASNs as peers. ISPs are identified by downstream customer cone relationships and absence of mobile-specific prefix patterns. This classification reflects observed routing reality and may differ from official Myanmar government licensing categories or operator marketing designations — a distinction that becomes significant when licensing structures and operational infrastructure diverge, as has been documented following forced ownership transfers since 2021.

Monitored ASNs & Cross-Validation

We track all autonomous systems registered to Myanmar-based operators, including mobile network operators (MPT AS9988, Mytel AS136168, Ooredoo Myanmar AS132748, Atom Myanmar AS132167), international gateway providers, internet exchange points, and government-adjacent infrastructure. BGP withdrawal events are cross-referenced against OONI anomaly spikes and Cloudflare Radar traffic drops; deliberate shutdown classification is applied only when routing withdrawal persists and is corroborated by independent application-layer interference data. Confirmed shutdown events are further validated against contemporaneous reporting from DVB, The Irrawaddy, and international newswires. The full list of monitored networks is available via the JSON export above.