

# Myanmar Election 2025-2026: Censorship Snapshot

**18.6%**

OONI anomaly rate Dec 2025 (below Nov's 23.2% — no spike)

**95**

Access Now-verified shutdowns in Myanmar 2025 (KeepItOn)

**89%**

Facebook OONI anomaly rate during election period

**42**

Domains tracked — avg 77% blocked across all categories


## Signal 1 + Signal 2 — OONI Anomaly Rate (bars) · Cloudflare Radar Monthly Avg (line)

Two independent data sources on one timeline. Bars: share of OONI measurements returning anomalous results (left axis). Line: CF Radar traffic index monthly average (right axis). No spike on election days confirms ambient censorship model.




## Cloudflare Radar Weekly — Aug 2025-Apr 2026

Amber: election period. Red: post-election routing shift (Feb 2026+) consistent with Great Firewall-style infrastructure activation.



## Average OONI Blocking Rate by Category

Mean anomaly rate across 42 tracked domains (OONI Web Connectivity, Apr 2026).



## KEY FINDINGS — CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS

- 1 No election-day spike — the absence is the finding.** OONI anomaly rates in December 2025 (18.6%) were *lower* than November (23.2%). The junta staged an election inside a pre-censored information environment and required no additional emergency action.
- 2 Ambient censorship replaced acute shutdown.** Facebook (89% blocked), independent media (66–81%), and VPN services (69–87%) were inaccessible throughout the election period. With 95 verified shutdown events in 2025 and 131+ townships under full blackout, Myanmar voters had no access to independent information.
- 3 Post-election routing shift signals infrastructure change.** Cloudflare Radar traffic jumped from 37% (Jan 2026) to 69 → 84 → 93% in February 2026 — a sustained structural change consistent with the activation of a centralised national firewall linked to the Geedge Networks–China collaboration exposed in September 2025.
- 4 Two independent signals, one consistent picture.** OONI application-layer measurements and Cloudflare Radar network-layer data independently confirm the same trajectory: steady chronic censorship through the election, then a qualitative escalation post-February 2026. BGP routing data (active from April 2026) now monitors 130+ Myanmar ASNs in real time.

## Download the underlying datasets (CC BY 4.0 · internetinmyanmar.com)

[ooni\\_timeseries.csv](#)

[keepiton\\_shutdowns.csv](#)

[bgp\\_events.csv](#)

[unified\\_events.json](#)